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SYMPOSIUM
CHEVRON AT 30: LOOKING BACK
AND LOOKING FORWARD
FOREWORD
Peter M. Shane* & Christopher J. Walker**
This year marks the thirtieth anniversary of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.1 This seminal U.S. Supreme Court decision
regarding the judicial deference owed to federal agency statutory
interpretations is the most-cited administrative law decision of all time:
Chevron has been cited in over 68,000 total sources available on
Westlaw—including in over 13,500 subsequent judicial decisions, in over
41,000 court filings, and in nearly 12,000 law review articles and secondary
sources.2 Over the last three decades, courts, litigants, and scholars have
addressed numerous Chevron-related questions, such as what Chevron
deference means, when (or even if) it should apply, and what impact it has
had on the administrative state—just to name a few. To borrow a line from
Justice Scalia in a Chevron-related decision, ―[i]t is indeed a wonderful new
world that the Court creates, one full of promise for administrative law
* Jacob E. Davis and Jacob E. Davis II Chair in Law, The Ohio State University Michael E.
Moritz College of Law.
** Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of
Law.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. To arrive at the conclusion that Chevron is the most cited administrative law
decision of all time, we checked the citations on Westlaw for every Supreme Court decision
cited in the latest edition of JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL, PETER M. SHANE, M.
ELIZABETH MAGILL, MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUELLAR, NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM (7th ed. 2014). Of the over 550
cases reviewed, two cases were cited more than Chevron (as of October 1, 2014): Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), with 105,566 total citations; and
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), with 71,840 total citations. The next two most
cited cases after Chevron were Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999),
with 53,289 total citations; and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), with
48,608 total citations. We do not count Daubert (or Kumho) and Harlow as administrative
law cases, as Daubert and Kumho deal primarily with expert-witness qualifications and
Harlow addresses qualified and absolute immunity. By comparison, as of October 1, 2014,
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), had 9,811 total citations; and Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), had 11,291 total citations. The full list with citation
counts is on file with the authors. Our thanks go to research assistants Justin Nelson and
Molly Werhan for compiling these statistics.
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professors in need of tenure articles and, of course, for litigators.‖3 But
Justice Scalia‘s statement is too limited. Chevron jurisprudence holds
promises and puzzles, too, for already tenured faculty, courts, legislators,
and agency officials.
Chevron‘s thirtieth anniversary provides a fitting moment to reflect on
how Chevron and its progeny have shaped and will continue to shape the
modern administrative state. To seize this moment, the Fordham Law
Review convened a symposium at the Fordham University School of Law
on March 7, 2014. A dozen scholars from across the country presented
papers, and many more scholars and students participated in the discussion.
The live symposium was organized into four panels: (1) Chevron in the
Courts, (2) Chevron in Congress, (3) Chevron in the Executive, and (4)
Chevron at 30: Big Deal? Good Deal? Bad Deal?4 This issue of the Law
Review presents the final versions of those papers.
In this Foreword, we introduce the contributions to the symposium and
focus on a number of recurring themes that both look back on the first thirty
years of Chevron and look forward to the next thirty. The Foreword
proceeds as follows:
Part I provides a brief sketch of the development of the Chevron
deference regime over the last three decades and explores the continuing
uncertainties about Chevron‘s scope and application, especially after the
Court‘s decision last year in City of Arlington v. FCC.5 The vast majority
of contributors weighed in on these issues to some extent, with a half dozen
focusing extensively on them.
Part II introduces the various contributions that focus on secondgeneration Chevron issues by exploring empirically and theoretically
Chevron‘s impact outside of the judicial review context—i.e., its effect on
legislative- and administrative-drafting theory and practice, its influence
within the regulatory state more generally, and its adoption (or lack thereof)
in state administrative law. These are undertheorized and empirically
underexplored areas where no doubt much work will continue to be done
over the next thirty years.
Part III turns to another growth area: the intersection of Chevron and
federalism. Two contributions focus on the role of federalism in defining
the scope of Chevron and how courts and Congress should—or should
not—limit Chevron‘s scope based on the effect such agency action will
have on the states.
The Foreword concludes by taking a step back after thirty years and
grappling with the contributors‘ diverse views (including our own) on

3. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1019
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. Video of the symposium panels is available on the Law Review‘s website at
http://fordhamlawreview.org. We thank the Fordham University School of Law and the
Fordham Law Review for hosting this symposium as well as Professors Abner S. Greene,
Clare Huntington, Joseph Landau, and Olivier Sylvain for moderating the panels.
5. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
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whether Chevron is indeed a big deal and, if so, whether it is a good or bad
deal for the modern administrative state.
I. CHEVRON AFTER THIRTY YEARS: CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY
ABOUT SCOPE AND APPLICATION
The bulk of scholarship on Chevron has focused on its scope, application,
and rationales with respect to judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations. As the contributions to this symposium nicely illustrate,
this line of scholarship is alive and well and will no doubt endure for
decades to come—in large part because the Court continues to tinker with
the Chevron deference regime.
When Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in 1984, articulated the
Chevron two-step approach, at first blush it may have seemed like a fairly
straightforward rule that would be easily administrable in the lower courts:
When a court reviews an agency‘s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency‘s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.6

This deference rule, Justice Stevens explained, follows from the fact (or
perhaps legal fiction) that in such circumstances Congress has explicitly or
implicitly ―left a gap for the agency to fill . . . by regulation.‖7 Such
congressional delegation to federal agencies—as opposed to courts—to be
the primary interpreters of statutes agencies administer was justified on
grounds of comparative expertise of federal agencies in policymaking and
reconciling conflicting political interests, and on the comparative political
accountability of agencies (as opposed to courts).8
In the footnotes accompanying the two-step approach quoted above,
Justice Stevens provided some additional, seemingly basic instructions on
how the steps should work. As to the first step regarding statutory
ambiguity, footnote nine instructs that the reviewing court should
―[e]mploy[] the traditional tools of statutory construction‖ to determine
whether ―Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue.‖9 As
to the second step regarding permissibility of the agency‘s interpretation,
footnote eleven states that ―[t]he court need not conclude that the agency
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold
6.
7.
8.
9.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 843–44.
See id. at 844–45, 864–66.
Id. at 843 n.9.
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the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the
question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.‖10 For the agency‘s
construction of an ambiguous statute to be permissible under Step Two, it
simply must be ―a reasonable interpretation.‖11
As the last thirty years have demonstrated, however, these instructions
turned out to be far from easy to follow. As to Step One, questions abound
about the traditional tools of statutory construction that should apply. For
instance, should more purposivist methodologies—such as legislative
history—be used to construe away ambiguities at Step One, or should such
inquiry be left to the Step Two reasonableness prong (if anywhere)?12
What role should substantive canons, such as constitutional avoidance,
play?13 Should a prior judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute play
no role at Chevron Step One to limit a subsequent agency statutory
interpretation? At least for now, the Court has resolved the last of these
questions14—a decision Abbe Gluck notes in her contribution to this
symposium as having ―enormous repercussions for the allocation of power
between courts and agencies.‖15
Chevron Step Two is similarly not lacking for debate or confusion. For
instance, is the Step Two reasonableness inquiry separate and distinct from
arbitrary and capricious review under the Administrative Procedure Act16
(APA)? In his symposium contribution, Jack Beermann assesses the
current state of Step Two, concluding that ―the Roberts Court has failed
miserably to clarify the boundary between Chevron and other standards of
review such as [the APA‘s] arbitrary or capricious review.‖17 Indeed, in

10. Id. at 843 n.11.
11. Id. at 844.
12. For a recent contribution to this debate, see John F. Manning, Chevron and
Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
13. Compare Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (constitutional avoidance trumps Chevron), and Cass R.
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 330 (2000) (substantive canons
trump Chevron), with ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 211 (2006) (Chevron trumps substantive
canons), and Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 915 (2001) (Chevron trumps constitutional avoidance), and Christopher J. Walker,
Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Interpretations of Law: A
Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 139, 143–44 (2012)
(same), and with Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008)
(constitutional avoidance applies at Chevron Step Two), and Kenneth A. Bamberger,
Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 93–94
(2008) (substantive canons apply at Chevron Step Two).
14. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83
(2005).
15. Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory
Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 625 (2014).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
17. Jack M. Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All These
Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 732 (2014) [hereinafter Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts
Court]; accord Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 807–08
(2010).
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part because of the apparent overlap between the two steps, there is a
growing scholarly debate (with Justice Scalia chiming in18) about whether
Chevron has, or should have, one or two steps.19
But the aspect of Chevron that has received the most attention—both in
this symposium and in the literature more generally—is a threshold step not
expressly articulated in Chevron itself. This ―Chevron Step Zero‖ inquiry,
as symposium contributors Thomas Merrill and Kristin Hickman coined it
years ago, concerns which agency actions even qualify for Chevron
review.20 The Court addressed this issue head on in 2001—at a time when
Chevron was a mere teenager—in United States v. Mead Corp.21 The
Mead Court declared that not all agency action is reviewed under Chevron,
but instead there must be evidence of congressional delegation.22 The
Court noted that ―a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron
treatment [is] express congressional authorizations to engage in the
rulemaking or adjudication process that produces the regulations or rulings
for which deference is claimed.‖23 But the Mead Court further noted that it
had ―sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such
administrative formality was required and none was afforded.‖24 In the
absence of such evidence of delegation, the Mead Court indicated that the
less deferential review standard articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
controls.25 Under Skidmore, an agency‘s reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statute does not control as it would under Chevron; instead, the
court gives the agency‘s interpretation ―weight‖ based on ―the thoroughness
evident in [the agency‘s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade.‖26
As Kristin Hickman points out in her contribution to this symposium, the
elaboration of deference doctrine in the form of ―steps‖ has led the Supreme

18. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1846 n.1 (2012)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting that ― ‗Step 1‘ has never
been an essential part of Chevron analysis‖).
19. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L.
REV. 611 (2009); Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L.J. 605 (2014);
Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV.
597 (2009).
20. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 13, at 836–37 (2001); see also Cass Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207–11 (2006).
21. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). As Kristin Hickman further details in her contribution to the
symposium, ―understanding Mead‘s aftermath requires viewing Mead not in isolation but as
part of a trilogy of cases consisting of Mead, Christensen v. Harris County, and Barnhart v.
Walton.‖ Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 531
(2014).
22. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
23. Id. at 229.
24. Id. at 231.
25. Id. at 226–28 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
26. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Peter Strauss has helpfully reframed these deference
standards as ―Chevron space‖ and ―Skidmore weight.‖ Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too
Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1143, 1144–45 (2012).
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Court and lower courts on many occasions to apply the doctrine as if
following a kind of decision tree.27 Under this approach, courts ask first, à
la Mead, whether the agency issued its challenged interpretation in a
context where Congress has delegated to the agency the authority ―to speak
with the force of law.‖28 If the answer is positive, then the agency, à la
Chevron, is entitled to judicial deference to any reasonable interpretation it
adopts, unless the relevant statute clearly speaks to the issue at hand in a
way that precludes the agency‘s approach.29 If the answer is negative, then
the agency is entitled only to Skidmore deference.30 Conceptualizing
deference doctrine in this way holds out the seeming promise of fairly
bright-line guidance. Courts could categorically identify certain agency
processes—most obviously, formal adjudication and notice-and-comment
rulemaking31—as entitling the agency to Chevron deference. Statutes
might then be divided into those that clearly affirm or preclude the agency
reading (Step One cases), on one hand, and legally ambiguous statutes (Step
Two cases), on the other.
Uncertainty, however, surrounds every part of this picture. For example,
Justice Scalia thinks the Mead inquiry an unnecessary and confusing
prelude to Chevron. For Scalia, Chevron applies to any legal interpretation
that represents the ―authoritative view‖ of the agency; the ―force of law‖
inquiry is inappropriately limiting.32 Because Chevron mandates deference,
however, only when the relevant statute is not susceptible to a legally
unambiguous reading, this does not—at least in Justice Scalia‘s case—
necessarily augur more frequent deference than if Chevron were limited in
the way Mead contemplates. As Professor Hickman notes, that is because,
in purporting to apply Chevron, Justice Scalia is so frequently confident
that he can divine a statute‘s clear legal meaning by applying his
understanding of the appropriate traditional tools of construction.33 Step
Two deference is simply irrelevant in cases where judges stop at Step One.
For his part, Justice Breyer—another of the administrative law professors
on the Court—would obliterate nearly all the bright-line-ishness of the
decision tree. He presumably agrees that a statute susceptible only to a
single legally unambiguous reading, based on traditional tools of statutory
interpretation, ought to be implemented according to that reading.34 In the
face of ambiguity, however, he would calibrate the weightiness of deference
to be accorded to the agency based on all relevant contextual factors.35
27. Hickman, supra note 21, at 537–41.
28. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 234–35.
31. In City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013), the Court clarified that an
agency‘s use of congressionally authorized formal procedures is not just ―a very good
indicator‖ of congressional delegation but a sufficient one.
32. Mead, 533 U.S. at 239–40, 258–59 & n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. Hickman, supra note 21, at 545–47.
34. E.g., Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
1003–06 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
35. Id.
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Strong evidence that Congress did or did not intend to delegate binding
interpretive power to an agency would be one of these factors, but it would
not necessarily be controlling either way. As Professor Hickman notes,
cases exist that appear to track the Breyer approach more than they do any
decision tree.36
But even if one follows the decision tree model of deference doctrine, it
remains uncertain how to handle Chevron Step One—the injunction to the
courts, that is, of deciding whether Congress has spoken with sufficient
clarity on the question at issue so as to foreclose the agency‘s interpretation
as a matter of law. Courts are told to apply ―traditional tools of statutory
interpretation‖ to determine if the agency under review has acted within the
bounds of what is statutorily permissible.37 One puzzle is whether these
tools include Skidmore deference.
In his contribution, Peter Strauss argues that, even at Step One, some
measure of deference is owed to the agency‘s position.38 He concludes that
Skidmore deference is appropriate at Step One because the rationales for
giving weight to an agency‘s view—namely, respecting the agency‘s
possible involvement in drafting the relevant statute and its unique
obligations and perspective regarding often complex statutory schemes—
are apposite even at this stage. He finds it ominous that such deference
goes largely unmentioned in City of Arlington v. FCC,39 in which the Court
held the Chevron framework applicable even to questions of statutory
interpretation that might be thought ―jurisdictional.‖ Professor Strauss
reads the majority‘s dicta about Step One as implying that only textualist
statutory analysis is appropriate under Step One, and that such an analysis is
to be deployed ―rigorously‖40—by implication, de novo—by the court.
Professor Strauss reads the dissent also as limiting Skidmore. The dissent
says: ―[T]he question whether an agency enjoys [interpretive] authority
must be decided by a court, without deference to the agency.‖41 Professor
Strauss reads this as a repudiation of Skidmore deference on a question that
he takes to be, in Chief Justice Roberts‘s view, a Chevron Step One
question.42 As Professor Strauss reads nearly two centuries of precedent,
however, there is no category of judicial review of statutory interpretation
by government administrators that is entirely deference-free. If present on
any Step One question, including a jurisdictional question, the factors that
give an agency‘s interpretation the ―power to persuade, if [not] to
control,‖43 ought still to be given weight.

36. Hickman, supra note 21, at 542–45.
37. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
n.9 (1984).
38. Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 789 (2014).
39. 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1872–73 (2013).
40. Id. at 1874.
41. Id. at 1878 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
42. Strauss, supra note 38, at 796.
43. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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Professor Merrill takes a very different tack in his contribution.44 He
embraces instead the core thesis of the Roberts dissent in City of Arlington,
arguing that, before a court owes any agency Chevron deference on any
question at all, the court must confirm on its own something more than a
legislative delegation to speak with the force of law in a general sense.
Rather, the court must find a delegation of interpretive authority over the
particular statutory provision in question—which is what the parties called
a jurisdictional issue. A court cannot pursue this inquiry in quite the way it
attacks a Chevron Step One question because factors other than the
statutory language at issue may appropriately persuade a court that no
interpretive delegation should be inferred. What Professor Merrill calls
―boundary maintenance,‖ an ―important function of judicial review,‖
includes . . . important precepts, such as the requirements that agencies
honor individuals‘ rights, abstain from interfering with authority given to
other agencies, abide by relevant obligations contained in international
law, and respect the traditional prerogatives of state and local
governments.45

Where the potential exists for crossing institutional boundaries improperly
with regard to the implementation of a particular statutory provision, courts
might well conclude that judges are the most qualified umpires to determine
if the agency has asserted its authority permissibly. This formulation
implicitly recognizes a class of cases where (1) Congress may not have so
clearly addressed the issue the agency addresses as to result in a clear
boundary line that the agency must obey—that is, the statute at issue may
be ambiguous—but (2) despite the ambiguity of the provision at issue, it is
unreasonable to treat the agency as enjoying delegated authority to give the
provision any reasonable interpretation it chooses.
Professor Merrill‘s approach may or may not contradict Professor
Strauss‘s understanding of how to approach run-of-the-mill Chevron Step
One questions. On one hand, the argument that a statute, properly read,
forecloses an agency interpretation might be re-cast as an argument that the
statute‘s clear meaning belies any delegation of authority to the agency to
depart from that clear meaning. This is why the majority opinion in City of
Arlington insists that there is no difference between jurisdictional
challenges to an agency‘s interpretation of law and any other kind of
challenge.46 If all Step One issues are jurisdictional, however, then
Professor Merrill‘s approach would preclude according agency views any
Skidmore weight at that stage. But Professor Merrill seems to say it is the
focus on jurisdiction that is confusing; what is really at issue is the breadth
of an implicit delegation.47 If so, then, when the only challenge to an
agency‘s delegation is an insistence that it misread a clear statute—in other
words, a ―pure Step One‖ challenge—Skidmore deference is
44. Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753
(2014).
45. Id. at 753–754.
46. See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868.
47. See Merrill, supra note 44, at 759.
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unobjectionable. Deference would be anomalous only if there were some
institutional factor beyond the precise text in dispute to question whether
Congress would have preferred the agency over a court as the primary
interpreter of what a challenged provision means.
Professor Beermann has an explanation for the persistence of such
confusions as to Chevron‘s correct implementation: he thinks it incoherent
or, at least, ―inherently unstable.‖48 He chides the Roberts Court for failing
still to provide ―clear instructions‖ on ―when [Chevron] applies and when it
does not.‖49 He bemoans a lack of clarity as to the relationship between
deferential review under Step Two and the ―hard look‖ approach of APA
arbitrary and capricious review.50 He finds that decisions examining
agency discretion to adopt statutory interpretations that courts had rejected
pre-Chevron ―do not appear to be constrained by the Chevron framework or
any other discernible set of interpretive principles.‖51 Challenging the
theoretical bases for Chevron as ―fictional,‖52 he argues that the chief effect
of the fight over deference principles is to obscure underlying
disagreements as to the substantive merits of the actions being reviewed—
disagreements that better explain various Justices‘ votes than do the
Justices‘ disputes over deference doctrine.53
While taking no position on the theoretical coherence of Chevron, James
Brudney‘s study of 730 Supreme Court decisions to evaluate the use of
Chevron and Skidmore in the workplace law context54 lends support to the
Beermann hypothesis that substance may trump neutral deference doctrine
in predicting Justices‘ votes in statutory interpretation cases. The study
may also suggest that, despite the torrent of citations and law review articles
unleashed by Chevron, it portended no real change in the Court‘s overall
treatment of agency deference. On one hand, looking at the three key
48. Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court, supra note 17, at 750.
49. Id. at 742–43.
50. Id. at 741–50.
51. Id. at 741.
52. Id. at 750.
53. In his symposium contribution, Peter Shane, while not tackling the precise issue in
City of Arlington, takes a more sanguine view of Chevron than does Professor Beermann.
Chevron‘s central premise, he argues, is the distinction that underlies the foundational
nondelegation doctrine—a distinction between statutory boundaries that an agency is
required to interpret correctly and an area of statutory discretion within which an agency is
required only to act reasonably. Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of Law, and
Presidential Influence in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679, 685–86 (2014).
He appears untroubled by the Court‘s failure to draw clear lines between Chevron Step Two
review and APA arbitrary and capricious review because an agency‘s arguments for the
permissibility of its statutory reading are likely to track closely what would be its arguments
for the reasonableness of its implementation strategy. Id. at 688–90. Whether a court uses
one or the other rubric for its decision is most likely to turn on whether the challenge to
agency reasonableness is based on an alleged lack of principled connection between agency
action and the purposes and boundaries set in the relevant statute—which makes the dispute
look interpretive—or whether the agency is assertedly lacking in its demonstration that the
connections it posits actually exist on the record, which sounds more like an arbitrary and
capricious challenge.
54. James J. Brudney, Chevron and Skidmore in the Workplace: Unhappy Together, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 497 (2014).

484

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

agencies in making workplace law—the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL)—Professor Brudney finds that
the Court‘s formal post-Chevron-and-Mead articulation of deference
frameworks for each agency closely tracks the Court‘s pre-Chevron
treatment of each agency. That is, the NLRB benefited from fairly
generous judicial deference which then became Chevron deference, the
EEOC was subject to more searching review prior to getting Skidmore
deference in Title VII cases, and the DOL has been given more variable
treatment (pre- and post-Chevron) depending on the statutory program
involved.55 At the same time, however—and in contrast to pre-Chevron
years—agency win rates are higher when the agency position favors
employers as opposed to employees.56
Furthermore, even though the Court‘s approach in workplace law cases
frequently invokes the kinds of factors entailed in Chevron and Skidmore
analysis, in cases where the majority or dissent relied on agency deference,
two in three such cases made no reference to Chevron or Skidmore.57
Professor Brudney is careful to point to factors other than the Justices‘
economic ideology that may help explain his observations, but it seems
hard to gainsay the importance of the Justices‘ substantive views in these
cases. The possibility, to which Professor Beermann refers, seems realistic
that the deference frameworks are not really operating to discipline the
courts (or at least the Supreme Court) and make agency deference a more
influential factor in judicial review.
II. THE IMPACT OF CHEVRON OUTSIDE THE COURT
A number of symposium contributors focus on second-generation issues
related to Chevron deference—i.e., the effect Chevron has had on (A) the
theory and practice of legislative drafting and statutory interpretation;
(B) agency behavior within the administrative state; and (C) the
development of state administrative law. Each will be addressed in turn.
A. Chevron in Congress
As to legislative drafting, judicial deference to administrative
interpretations of law is based on Congress‘s express or implied delegation
of interpretative authority to the agency; until recently, little had been done
to evaluate Chevron‘s influence on legislative drafting. Two contributors
focus on the effect of Chevron within Congress.
Professor Gluck continues her pathbreaking work on the role of Chevron
in legislative drafting and statutory interpretation—focusing in this
symposium on what Chevron can teach us about the rest of statutory
interpretation.58 But before turning to her contribution, any symposium on
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 498–99.
Id. at 512 tbl.3.
Id. at 501.
Gluck, supra note 15.
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Chevron would be incomplete without first noting the key findings from
Professor Gluck‘s prior empirical study with Lisa Schultz Bressman on
congressional drafting, in which they asked 137 congressional drafters
forty-five questions about their knowledge of administrative law and the
extent to which it influences their drafting.59
Chevron, it turns out, was the most known, by name, of any interpretive
tool in the Bressman and Gluck study. The overwhelming majority
(82 percent) of congressional drafters surveyed were aware of this
background principle.60 Of those interviewed, 58 percent said Chevron
plays a role when drafting; 31 percent indicated in comments that statutory
ambiguity results in judicial deference to agency interpretations; and 29
percent reported that Chevron forces them to think about how precisely to
draft.61 Nine in ten (91 percent) stated that one reason for statutory
ambiguity is to delegate decision making to agencies, with lack of time (92
percent), complexity of issue (93 percent), and need for consensus (99
percent) being other predominant reasons.62
Mead and Skidmore are a somewhat different story. Unlike Chevron‘s
82 percent name recognition, 20 percent or less knew Skidmore and Mead
by name; 18 percent knew Skidmore but not Mead; and 8 percent knew
Mead but not Skidmore.63 Yet, by concept, Professors Gluck and Bressman
conclude that Mead was a ―big winner,‖ in that 88 percent indicated that the
delegation signal emphasized in Mead—congressional authorization of
agency rulemaking—is always or often relevant to whether drafters intend
for an agency to have interpretative authority.64
Professors Bressman and Gluck concluded that Chevron itself is not the
reason drafters leave ambiguities; instead, the reasons mirror those
articulated in Chevron—delegation of decision making, implementation,
expertise, etc.65 But these findings cast serious doubt on the longstanding
view that Chevron is merely a legal fiction. Congress appears to be quite
familiar with Chevron (or at least the congressional drafters surveyed are)—
either intentionally leaving ambiguities to delegate decision making to
agencies or at least knowingly legislating against this background Chevron
default. And congressional drafters understand the Mead factors and
believe that they are relevant to deriving congressional intent to delegate.

59. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I]; Lisa Schultz Bressman
& Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014).
60. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 59, at 995.
61. Id. at 996.
62. Id. at 997.
63. Id. at 995 (footnotes omitted). As Professors Gluck and Bressman note, however,
these numbers may be lower based on a change in how the questions were asked in the
survey. See id. at 995 n.337.
64. Id. at 999.
65. Id.
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As Kent Barnett documents in his symposium contribution and
elsewhere, not only do congressional drafters know about these
administrative law deference doctrines when drafting, but in at least one
instance Congress has actually codified a judicial review standard less
deferential than the Chevron default.66 In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Congress directed
courts to review under the less deferential Skidmore standard any decision
to preempt state law made by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC).67 It should be interesting to see whether Congress continues to
tinker with these judicially created deference doctrines, and perhaps even
more interesting to see how the Supreme Court responds. As Professor
Gluck notes in her contribution, that ―Congress could legislate some
different version of Chevron‖ distinguishes the administrative law
deference doctrines from other traditional tools of statutory interpretation
where courts have resisted the idea of methodological stare decisis.68
In her contribution, Professor Gluck builds on her prior empirical study
on congressional drafters—as well as on her other work on statutory
interpretation more generally69—to distinguish Chevron (and related
administrative law doctrines) from other statutory interpretation tools.70
She makes six main observations about those differences and what they
teach us about statutory interpretation: (1) As noted above, Chevron is a
precedent, whereas the other tools are usually considered ―rules of thumb‖;
yet (2) Chevron in essence codifies the rules of thumb by directing that they
apply at Step One. (3) Unlike the other interpretive tools, the Court has
attempted to ground Chevron in actual congressional intent, and (4) by
focusing on actual legislative intent, the Court has influenced how Congress
legislates by encouraging Congress to delegate with formal process if it
intends for Chevron to apply to particular agency statutory interpretations.
(5) While the Court has guarded jealously its control over statutory
interpretation from Congress, the Court has expressly ceded such power to
federal agencies by holding that a subsequent agency interpretation of an
ambiguous statute the agency administers trumps a prior judicial

66. Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405016; Kent Barnett, Improving Agencies’
Preemption Expertise with Chevmore Codification, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 587 (2014)
[hereinafter Barnett, Preemption and Chevmore].
67. Barnett, Preemption and Chevmore, supra note 66, at 599–600 (citing 12 U.S.C.
§ 25b(b)(5)(A) (2012)).
68. Gluck, supra note 15, at 614–17.
69. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology As “Law”
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1910 (2011); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory
Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health
Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011); Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law
of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753
(2013); Abbe R. Gluck, The States As Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010)
[hereinafter Gluck, States As Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation].
70. Gluck, supra note 15, at 609–11.
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interpretation.71 (6) Yet, the Court‘s understanding of congressional
drafting is outdated, especially in assuming congressional delegation to one
federal agency at a time when Congress often delegates to multiple agencies
and other actors.72
Following Professor Gluck‘s lead, in the years to come we expect more
scholars of statutory interpretation to look to Chevron and related doctrines
for lessons about advancing the theory and practice of statutory
interpretation. After all, as Professor Gluck‘s observations underscore,
Chevron provides a natural experiment of sorts between an interpretive tool
with precedential force and the rest of the traditional tools that lack such
force. And because Chevron is a precedent that incorporates nonprecedential rules of thumb at its first step, no doubt the future will see
many, many more law review articles, legal briefs, and judicial opinions on
which tools of statutory interpretation should apply to determine
congressional intent at Step One. Hopefully the realities of the modern-era
legislative process will play a more prominent role in the further
development of the Chevron deference regime.
B. Chevron Within the Regulatory State
Whereas most scholarship on Chevron has focused on Chevron in the
courts and some on Chevron in Congress, little attention has been paid to
the impact of Chevron inside the administrative state. Three contributions
to this symposium focus extensively on this topic, which will no doubt
receive much more attention in the years to come. All three of these
contributions also assess Chevron as a legitimizing function within the
modern administrative state.
First, Christopher Walker explores how thirty years of Chevron and
related administrative law doctrines have shaped agency rule drafting and,
in particular, whether the expectation of Chevron deference (as opposed to
Skidmore deference or de novo review) encourages federal agencies to be
more aggressive in their interpretive practices.73 He reports the Chevronrelated findings from a 195-question survey he conducted of 128 federal
agency rule drafters at seven executive departments and two independent
agencies. Of those who responded to the survey, nearly all (94 percent)
were aware of Chevron by name, and four in five (81 percent) were aware
71. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83
(2005).
72. Gluck, supra note 15, at 609–11. The Court‘s ―Schoolhouse Rock!‖ understanding
of lawmaking, arguably, is not limited to the legislative process. Id. at 611. As Aaron Saiger
observes in his contribution, Chevron‘s focus on political accountability as a justification for
Chevron ―troublingly and casually conflates the President, the ‗administration,‘ and the
agencies.‖ Aaron Saiger, Chevron and Deference in the State Administrative Law, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 555, 564 (2014).
73. Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical
Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703 (2014) [hereinafter Walker, Chevron Inside the
Regulatory State]. The full findings from the empirical study are reported in Christopher J.
Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2501716.
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of Skidmore.74 Although Mead was not as well known by name (at 61
percent), the rule drafters confirmed that they understood the basic
principles articulated in Mead—i.e., congressional authorization of
rulemaking or formal adjudication (at 84 percent) and the agency‘s use of it
(at 80 percent) affect whether an agency‘s interpretation receives Chevron
deference.75 To put those numbers in perspective, Chevron was the most
known of more than twenty interpretive tools included in the survey, and
Mead came in fourth place (behind only Chevron, the whole act rule, and
the ordinary meaning canon).76 These findings are similar to those of the
congressional drafters surveyed in the Bressman and Gluck study, discussed
in Part II.A, and similarly demonstrate how Chevron has become a principal
tool for drafters and interpreters in federal agencies as well as in Congress.
Moreover, nine in ten (90 percent) agency rule drafters indicated that
Chevron plays a role in their rule-drafting decisions. A similar number
agreed or strongly agreed that they think about judicial review when
drafting statutes (at 87 percent) and that their chances in court are better
under Chevron than Skidmore or no deference (at 83 percent). When asked
if federal agencies are more aggressive in their interpretive efforts if they
know Chevron applies, two in five (38 percent and 43 percent, depending
on how the question was phrased) strongly agreed or agreed, and another
two in five (45 percent and 40 percent) somewhat agreed.77 In other words,
these findings provide support for the propositions that the judicial review
standard matters as an ex ante check on agency rule-drafting behavior and
that an agency may draft differently if a court (or Congress, as further
discussed in Part III) tells the agency that Chevron or Skidmore applies. As
Professor Walker concludes, understanding how federal agencies draft
differently under distinct deference regimes is not merely academic but may
well go to the heart of the regulatory state‘s democratic legitimacy:
After all, Chevron and related doctrines attempt to strike a proper
separation of powers balance between the branches of government by
patrolling the delegation of authority from the principal (Congress) to its
unelected agents in the regulatory state. Whether the deference standards
help to faithfully control Fourth Branch lawmaking goes to the
democratic (and perhaps constitutional) legitimacy of the modern
administrative state.78

In her contribution, Emily Hammond further explores Chevron‘s role in
legitimizing administrative governance. As Professor Hammond explains,
―[t]he governing paradigm is that judicial review is a necessary component
of administrative legitimacy‖ because, among other things, ―[i]t acts as an
ex ante check on agency behavior by incentivizing agencies to promote
participation, engage in deliberation, and set forth their reasoning

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State, supra note 73, at 715–17 & fig.1.
Id. at 717–18 & tbl.1.
Id. at 717–18.
Id. at 722–25 & fig.3.
Id. at 728–29 (footnote omitted).
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transparently in the first instance.‖79 Building on her prior work with David
Markell,80 Professor Hammond explores the generality of Chevron‘s
legitimizing function—moving the conversation to unreviewable exercises
of authority to ―pinpoint just what it is courts provide when they undertake
review.‖81
To see Chevron as a generality principle rather than a specialized judicial
review doctrine of agency statutory interpretation, Professor Hammond
surveys a number of second-order contexts—i.e., the interpretation of
contracts, settlements, and land patents—where courts have invoked
Chevron.82 Based on the rationales utilized in these contexts, she offers
three metrics for measuring the legitimacy of agency action that is either
unreviewable or rarely reviewable: (1) whether the agency acts within its
scope of statutory authority, (2) exercising its expertise to provide
uniformity in law (3) with sufficient procedures in place.83 Although based
on Chevron, these legitimizing metrics sound a lot more like the Skidmore
factors. This perhaps should come as no surprise as Skidmore itself is about
the agency‘s ―power to persuade‖—or legitimize—based on ―the
thoroughness evident in [the agency‘s] consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,‖ and so
forth.84 It is also worth noting that the Chevron justification of political
accountability ―plays little to no role in the second-order Chevron
decisions.‖85 Professor Hammond observes that, ―[a]s a descriptive matter,
this omission invites rethinking about the place of presidential control in
administrative law doctrine.‖86
Peter Shane‘s exploration of the President‘s role in the Chevron
deference regime picks up precisely on this point.87 He begins by arguing
that Chevron fits well with a rule-of-law account of the administrative state
that emphasizes the duty of courts to implement Congress‘s administrative
designs. Far from regarding the delegation-based rationale for Chevron as
―fictional,‖ he relies on the Bressman and Gluck study noted in Part II.A as
substantiating that the delegation rationale meshes well with the reality of
statutory drafting. Because the Court‘s post-Chevron jurisprudence so
clearly establishes delegation and not political accountability as the primary
theoretical underpinning for Chevron, it is important for courts specifically
to respect Congress‘s decisions to vest administrative decision making
authority in officials other than the President.

79. Emily Hammond, Chevron’s Generality Principles, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 655, 656
(2014).
80. Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review:
Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (2013).
81. Hammond, supra note 79, at 673–74.
82. Id. at 666–73.
83. Id. at 673–78.
84. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
85. Hammond, supra note 79, at 677–78.
86. Id.
87. Shane, supra note 53.
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That is, contrary to ―unitary executive theorists,‖ Professor Shane does
not think the President enjoys any constitutional authority to direct agency
action in domestic affairs beyond such license as Congress gives the
President.88 As a result, courts need to be careful before according Chevron
deference to agency interpretations of law that are revealed to be the
product of White House pressure where the record reveals the agency‘s
earlier preference for a different interpretation that itself would have been
reasonable enough to warrant Chevron deference. In such cases, Professor
Shane would have the reviewing court remand to the agency to choose,
after further consideration and a supplemented record, between its original
interpretation and the interpretation on which the White House insisted.89
The only exception he thinks consistent with a rule-of-law view of Chevron
would be the presumably rare case in which the White House had required
an agency to pursue a permissible interpretation that the agency would
nonetheless not have preferred, but which makes it possible for other
agencies to discharge some related administrative responsibilities in a better
coordinated fashion. Deferring to White House influence in such a case
would respect a presidential power of interagency coordination that is
reasonably traceable to his role as chief executive.90
C. Chevron in the States
Aaron Saiger provides a unique perspective on the impact—or, better
said, lack thereof—of Chevron on state administrative law.91 After
reviewing a number of state-by-state surveys on Chevron and state-level
administrative law, he concludes: ―Although a significant number of states
have adopted deference doctrines that closely approximate Chevron‘s, few
have endorsed it wholeheartedly. Only a few have rejected it explicitly
either, but the majority of the states have deference doctrines meaningfully
different from Chevron‘s.‖92 He then explores the reasons why states have
not embraced Chevron in state-level administrative law.
Professor Saiger ultimately concludes that the differences between the
structures of federal and state governments make Chevron unsuitable for
blanket state-level adoption.93 In particular, state judges are not similarly
situated to federal judges, in that they lack life tenure and thus tend to be
closer to the political branches. Most states lack a unitary executive but,
instead, have a number of state-wide elected executive officials, all of
which have their distinct administrative functions and intraexecutive checks
and conflicts. And state legislatures, while most similar of the three
88. PETER M. SHANE, MADISON‘S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 32–42 (2009). For the contrary view, see STEVEN G. CALABRESI &
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON
TO BUSH (2008).
89. Shane, supra note 53, at 702.
90. Id.
91. See Saiger, supra note 72.
92. Id. at 582.
93. See id. at 560–70 (exploring the differences in all three branches).
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branches to their federal counterpart, have vastly different approaches to
nondelegation rules.94
Despite the lack of adoption at the state level, Professor Saiger argues
that states should not ignore Chevron. Much like Professor Gluck‘s
assertion that we can learn a lot from Chevron about the other tools of
statutory interpretation, Professor Saiger argues that Chevron has a lot to
teach states about judicial review of agency statutory interpretations:
―Chevron is a model for states not by virtue of its holding but of its multiinstitutional mode of analysis.‖95 Indeed, if modified to the structure of the
particular state government, he suggests that ―[t]he particular way in which
Chevron balances between politics, the rule of law, and bureaucratic
effectiveness is a worthy model for states to consider.‖96
There is little doubt that the next thirty years will see much
experimentation with Chevron in the laboratories of democracy as states
attempt to control state-level bureaucracy. But hopefully the breakthroughs
(and failures) in these laboratories will also be explored at the federal level.
For instance, as Professor Saiger notes and Professor Gluck documents
elsewhere, many states have embraced methodological stare decisis in
statutory interpretation that the federal system has rejected.97 More analysis
of those experiments—and how they might play out on the federal level
where the governmental structure differs substantially—is warranted.
III. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN CHEVRON AND FEDERALISM
With the continued (and perhaps renewed) scholarly interest in
federalism generally, it is no surprise that two contributors also focus on the
effect of federalism on judicial review of agency statutory interpretations.
Miriam Seifter tackles the topic head on, arguing that federalism should
play no role at Chevron Step Zero.98 Building on her prior work on the role
of states in the federal regulatory process,99 she explains that federalism
concerns are varied and diverse. Accordingly, a one-size-fits-all default
rule against Chevron when federalism concerns are implicated—thus
relegating such agency interpretations to either Skidmore deference or de
novo review—would do more harm than good. As she explains, the
question is not whether federalism should be considered in Chevron cases,
but whether there is any Step Zero test that can direct federalism analysis to
the most competent institution. Federalism‘s heterogeneity suggests that
this endeavor would be fraught, and thus would cause needless harm to the

94. Professor Saiger also contrasts the various state statutes and judicial standards of
review of state agency action with their federal counterparts. See id. at 570–79.
95. Id. at 583.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 584 (citing Gluck, States As Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation, supra
note 69).
98. Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2014).
99. Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 67 VAND. L. REV. 443 (2014);
Miriam Seifter, States As Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV.
953 (2014).
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coherence and simplicity that make Chevron useful.
Considering
federalism in Chevron‘s ordinary two steps (and under APA arbitrary and
capricious review), Professor Seifter argues, allows courts to police agency
interpretations effectively and at less cost.100
Professor Barnett‘s contribution to this symposium provides an
interesting contrast. As he explains, Congress in Dodd-Frank has directed
courts to review OCC preemption decisions under the less deferential
Skidmore standard.101 In other words, Congress has instructed that Chevron
does not apply to these decisions at Step Zero—precisely what Professor
Seifter asserts courts should not do. And, as Professor Barnett argues,
―[a]pplying Skidmore deference to agency preemption recognizes agencies‘
technical and administrative expertise while accounting for their lack of
experience in weighing federalism values in their preemption analysis.‖102
His argument is not that Chevron should never apply to agency preemption
decisions, but that Congress should encourage agencies to develop such
expertise by codifying Skidmore deference where agency inexpertness is
evident. As Professor Barnett notes, ―[t]he OCC‘s preemption of state
consumer-protection laws provides perhaps the most striking example of
inexpertness, preemption, and a congressional response.‖103 He concludes
by lauding the value of Chevmore codification:
Going forward, Congress can improve an agency‘s use of expertise as to
preemption specifically and other matters generally. Congress can lead
agencies to consider how their technical and administrative expertise
interacts with federalism values by requiring agencies to consider those
values and consult with affected parties [including states]. Congress can
also improve agencies‘ use of administrative and technical expertise both
inside and outside of the preemption context by using Chevron deference
as a ―carrot‖ [and Skidmore as a ―stick‖] for agencies to develop and
apply their expertise.104

It is not clear that Professors Barnett and Seifter actually disagree in any
fundamental way. Chevmore codification is different from blanket
consideration of federalism concerns by courts at Chevron at Step Zero; it is
a narrow, specific application codified by Congress as to one particular
agency. Perhaps they would agree that only the congressional principal—
not the judicial agent—should decide when Chevron does not apply to an
agency statutory interpretation that implicates federalism concerns (or other
areas where an agency has demonstrated incompetence). In all events, it
will be interesting to see whether Chevmore codification becomes
commonplace—as opposed to a one-off anomaly—and, if so, whether the

100. Seifter, supra note 98, at 652–54.
101. Barnett, Preemption and Chevmore, supra note 66, at 587 (citing 12 U.S.C.
§ 25b(b)(5)(B) (2012)).
102. Id. at 594 (citing Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV.
737, 797 (2008)).
103. Barnett, Preemption and Chevmore, supra note 66, at 596.
104. Id. at 604.
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Court will push back on congressional attempts to alter the judicially
created and calibrated Chevron deference regime.105
CONCLUSION: CHEVRON: BIG DEAL? GOOD DEAL? BAD DEAL?
At the March 2014 symposium, the panel entitled ―Chevron: Big Deal?
Good Deal? Bad Deal?‖ featured Professors Beermann, Merrill, and
Strauss. Not surprisingly, however, a variety of responses are discernible
from most, if not all, the contributors.
Professor Beermann stands out in the group for his unequivocal negative
assessment of Chevron. Three decades, in his judgment, have revealed that
Chevron rests on unstable premises, obscures and distracts from what is
often at stake in statutory interpretation cases, and is applied by the
Supreme Court so inconsistently as to leave lower courts (and lawyers)
more perplexed than well guided.106 As discussed in Part I, Professor
Brudney‘s analysis is arguably consistent with the obscurity point. Yet his
observation that the formal deference accorded the different agencies
engaged in making workplace law did not really change from the preChevron to the post-Chevron period suggests that the judicial impact of
Chevron might well be overestimated, especially with regard to the
Supreme Court itself.107
Professors Strauss and Shane seem to be of the mind that, Justice Scalia‘s
insistence to the contrary notwithstanding, Chevron was not intended and
should not be read as a major displacement of prior administrative
jurisprudence. Professor Strauss may worry that a misinterpretation of
Chevron could undermine judicial respect for a centuries-old doctrine that
agency interpretations of the statutes they administer ought always to be
eligible for some weight in the course of judicial review.108 Professor
Merrill, however, does not see in City of Arlington the same inattention to
Mead/Skidmore deference that Professor Strauss bemoans. Indeed, he
thinks it significant that the majority opinion penned by Justice Scalia
includes what is arguably an acquiescent nod to Mead.109 Professor Shane,
as noted above, thinks Chevron simply plays out a logic of judicial review
already implicit in the nondelegation doctrine. His main criticism of

105. As Professor Walker explores in his contribution, it is also an open question whether
Chevmore codification will change agency interpretive practices, especially in the
preemption context. See Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State, supra note 73, at 721
(reporting that ―over half of the rule drafters surveyed already do not assume Chevron
deference applies to agency preemption decisions—and, indeed, half apply the presumption
against preemption when there is an ambiguity—[such that] congressional modification
from Chevron space to Skidmore weight would have no effect on agency statutory
interpretation at least with respect to those rule drafters‖).
106. Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court, supra note 17, at 731–33.
107. Brudney, supra note 54, at 498.
108. Strauss, supra note 38.
109. Merrill, supra note 44, at 757.
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Chevron, if it be one, is that its deference mandate is expressed in rhetoric
that makes it sound more frequently consequential than it is likely to be.110
For their part, Professors Hickman and Merrill also appear to see
Chevron as fitting in a useful and not especially disruptive way into the
jurisprudence of judicial review. Now that Mead has expressly elaborated
on Chevron by incorporating the Merrill-Hickman Step Zero inquiry into
the nature of the authority Congress delegated to the agency under review,
Professor Hickman finds lower courts turning helpfully to the cases, most
often in a decision tree mode, but sometimes also (as does the Supreme
Court) in a manner more reminiscent of Justice Breyer‘s multiple factors
approach.111 Professor Merrill is chiefly critical of the Court‘s failure to
take seriously enough the delegation-based rationale for Chevron, but
argues that the emphasis on delegation that was central to Chief Justice
Roberts‘s dissent in City of Arlington ought to prevail over time.112
Perhaps the most surprising conclusion implicit or explicit in the various
symposium contributions, however, is that the ―big deal‖ of Chevron is
most evident if one looks beyond its impact on the federal courts to its
impact on the other federal branches and its potential impact on the states.
The survey-based analyses that Professors Gluck and Walker undertook,
respectively, regarding the drafting staff in Congress and in the agencies,
confirms Chevron‘s role as a widely understood default principle that
affects how statutes and regulations are drafted.113 Professor Walker‘s
finding that rule makers may draft more aggressively in contexts they
recognize as Chevron-eligible114 resonates with Professor Hammond‘s
observation that deference doctrine affects the legitimacy of agency
decision making by intensifying or relaxing ex ante incentives for
conscientious agency behavior.115 Because courts now apply Chevron Step
Two analysis with the rigor of ―hard look‖ review under the APA‘s
arbitrary and capricious standard, it seems likely that agency lawyers worry
less, post-Chevron, about showing that their interpretations are legally
compelled and more about showing that their justifications find grounding
in the record. As Professor Barnett argues, Chevron and Mead together

110. Peter M. Shane, Ambiguity and Policy Making: A Cognitive Approach to
Reconciling Chevron and Mead, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 19 (2005) (arguing that Chevron
deference, properly understood, should be outcome-decisive only in those cases in which a
judge is persuaded that there exists an interpretation of the relevant statute that is not legally
compelled, but nonetheless superior to the agency‘s reasonable, but less attractive
interpretation).
111. Hickman, supra note 21, at 547–53. Professor Seifter would apparently hold out
little hope for a decision tree approach in cases implicating administrative federalism. She
argues that Chevron must turn to the use of standards (instead of rules) in the federalism
context, underscoring that ―federalism inquiries and values tend to be multifaceted and
nuanced in ways that make them poor fits for more formalistic, rule-bound features of
administrative law.‖ Seifter, supra note 98, at 638.
112. Merrill, supra note 44, at 757–58.
113. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 59, at 995–99; Walker, Chevron Inside the
Regulatory State, supra note 73, at 715–17 & fig.1.
114. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State, supra note 73, at 722–25 & fig.3.
115. Hammond, supra note 79, at 673–74.
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have also given Congress an effective vocabulary for calibrating the
deference it wants courts to give to agencies when Congress wants to make
that choice explicit.116
Professor Saiger finds that Chevron has been less of a big deal in the
states than it deserves to be.117 Like much of federal separation of powers
jurisprudence, Chevron cannot and should not be adopted by states
mechanically because state constitutions differ as to government
organization, and the institutional characteristics of state courts,
legislatures, and agencies may differ sufficiently from those of the federal
government to warrant somewhat different understandings for the
appropriate occasions for and scope of deference to be accorded agency
views of state law. Yet, as noted above, Chevron‘s analysis of the issues
posed by deference doctrine provide a model of sorts for how state courts
might sort out an appropriate balance between politics, the rule of law, and
agency expertise. As state governments continue to grow in size and range
of activity, it seems inevitable that scholars will increasingly turn their
attention to this very question.
There is, of course, one way in which the ―big deal‖ of Chevron is
unassailable. It has energized a virtual cottage industry within the academy
of reexamining—both descriptively and normatively—the relationship of
courts and agencies and the appropriate role and recognition in the
administrative state of rule of law values. Administrative law is built
around—indeed, necessitated by—the inevitability and ubiquity of agency
discretion in contemporary governance. Judicial review, as Professor
Hammond says, is widely taken to be an essential component to the
legitimacy of administrative governance.118 So long as these things are
true, the issues highlighted by this symposium will remain ripe for
discussion and are likely to sustain symposia for many more of Chevron‘s
birthdays.

116. Barnett, Preemption and Chevmore, supra note 66, at 587.
117. Saiger, supra note 72, at 582–84.
118. Hammond, supra note 79, at 673–74.

